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A TIME TO DANCE 
Tony Angelo,* Jessica Kerr** and Bayley Roylance*** 
There is, as is declared in Ecclesiastes, a time for everything and in particular "a time to dance", "a 
time to rejoice", and "a time where every person should eat and drink and enjoy the good of their 
labours".1 The three authors here join celebrating the service of their colleague, mentor and friend 
by tendering some comparative comments on the law of Seychelles.  
I INTRODUCTION 
The completion of 40 years' service to this University and to this Faculty is truly something to 
celebrate. The purpose of this article is to participate in that celebration and to present some 
thoughts from recent and proposed reforms of the law of the Republic of Seychelles,2 with 
particular reference to the areas of academic interest of Bill Atkin. Three areas are considered: 
defamation in Part II, family law matters in Part III, and alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in Part 
IV. 
The comparative context of the chosen topics is Seychelles, which having experienced double 
colonisation by the French and the English, now combines in one micro island jurisdiction "both 
continental ('civil law') private law and 'common law' public law with judicial institutions and 
procedural and evidential law reflecting significant assimilation of Anglo-American legal 
mechanisms".3  
  
*  Professor of Law, Victoria University of Wellington. 
**  BA/LLB(Hons) (VUW), LLM (Yale), Seychelles Financial Intelligence Unit. 
***  BA/LLB (VUW). 
1  Ecclesiastes 3. The enigmatic title also reflects the writing of a leading Seychelles lawyer and Anglican 
canon lawyer of the Mascareignes area. See Bernard Georges A Time to Dance (Melrose Books, 
Cambridgeshire, 2011). 
2  For an overview of the legal system of Seychelles, see Jessica Kerr "Finding the Law in Seychelles" 
(January/February 2015) GlobaLex <www.nyulawglobal.org>.  
3  Mathilda Twomey "The Parts That Make a Whole? The Mixity of the Laws of Seychelles" in Anna Koppel, 
Mohamed Y Matter and Vernon Palmer (eds) Mixed Legal Systems, East and West: Newest Trends and 
Developments (Ashgate, Surrey, 2014) 55 at 55, citing Vernon Palmer (ed) Mixed Legal Systems 
Worldwide: The Third Legal Family (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001). 
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A  Defamation  
In Seychelles there have been, and continue to be, many challenges in the field of defamation. 
The Civil Code provides expressly that the law of civil defamation is the law of England; that is to 
say, the law of England as at 1976, the time when the Civil Code was promulgated.4 This has raised 
a number of academic questions as well as important practical ones. For instance, is the reference to 
the law of England a reference to the substantive legal principles only? Or does it relate also to the 
procedure? Or to the remedies that can be provided? And what of the period of limitation?  
B  Family Law 
The biggest challenges in the civil law are undoubtedly in the field of family law, and in relation 
to the status of children and domestic partners both inter vivos and on succession. If the goal is 
equality – and there is no reason to doubt that it is, because of the constitutional provisions,5 the fact 
of ratification by Seychelles of all major human rights documents and also the commitment to the 
South African Development Community – the current law and practice is far from equal in outcome. 
The challenge is to develop the law from that of Napoleon to the needs of Seychelles in the 21st 
century.  
C  Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Informal approaches to problem-solving, drawing on personal connections and community 
experience, may be second nature on the islands, but a litigious streak in Seychelles society can 
escalate a private matter into a public saga, and the civil courts struggle to bear the load. There is 
ample space within the legislative architecture for ADR practice, and recent mediation reforms 
reflect acceptance of the need to look proactively to alternatives to litigation. Whether a jurisdiction 
of the size of Seychelles has the resources and patience to develop significantly in that direction in 
practice remains to be seen.  
II  DEFAMATION 
The Seychelles Court of Appeal said it best in Laporte v Fanchette, when it described the law of 
defamation in Seychelles as "dynamic".6 Claims in defamation find their basis in art 1383(3) of the 
Civil Code of Seychelles, which states that: "The provisions of this article and of article 1382 of this 
Code shall not apply to the civil law of defamation which shall be governed by English law". It is 
this foundational provision that has drawn much comment from the courts of Seychelles. The 
  
4  This is the current law. The rule that the civil law of defamation should be the English law was originally 
introduced into the Seychelles system on 3 May 1948 by the Defamation Ordinance. 
5  The Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles, arts 16 ("Every person has a right to be treated with dignity 
worthy of a human being") and 27 ("Every person has a right to equal protection of the law … without 
discrimination on any ground except as is necessary in a democratic society"). 
6  Laporte v Fanchette (2013) SLR 593 (CA) at [1]. 
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provision makes defamation one of the few causes of action which are based in English law rather 
than arts 1382–1386 of the Civil Code which govern other delictual actions.7 This places Seychelles 
in the position of being a "mixed jurisdiction with French tort law but English defamation rules and 
a Constitution recognising the right to freedom of expression".8 The "dynamic" complexity that 
results is aptly illustrated by reference to some key Seychelles defamation cases.  
A  Applicable Law 
The scope of art 1383(3) has been often discussed in judgments of the Seychelles courts. The 
courts have had to determine the legal principles, remedies and procedural law applicable to 
defamation claims.  
1 Substantive law 
The distinct position defamation claims have relative to claims in "fault" has been well-defined. 
Claims in defamation are not claims in delict under the Civil Code. The concepts which mirror the 
French Civil Code therefore do not apply. Certainly, the Court of Appeal in Seychelles Broadcasting 
Corporation v Barrado rejected any suggestion that the provisions of the Seychelles Civil Code, and 
not English law, could apply in cases of defamation.9  
The Seychelles Court of Appeal has also held that the existence of a separate regime for 
defamation claims does not oust actions outside the scope of defamation.10 Any written or spoken 
word which does not amount to defamation, but still causes harm, may be compensated for under art 
1382(1), the article of the Civil Code which provides the foundation for claims in delict. For 
example, while the law of defamation is not considered able to grant relief for purely abusive and 
insulting language,11 redress may be sought in delict. This was the case in Laporte v Fanchette. The 
defendant, Mr Fanchette, got into an altercation with Mr Laporte after being denied entry to the 
casino managed by Mr Laporte. During the altercation Mr Fanchette said to Mr Laporte in Creole 
"it's a damn good thing that your child has died".12 A claim that the spoken words caused "pain, 
  
7  Articles 1382–1386 provide the basic law of tort for Seychelles. The articles are closely related to arts 
1382–1386 of the French Civil Code. See Laporte v Fanchette, above n 6, at [10]; and Civil Code of 
Seychelles, art 1383(2). 
8  Laporte v Fanchette, above n 6, at [1]. 
9  Seychelles Broadcasting Corporation v Barrado (1993–1994) SCAR 308 at [11]. 
10  Laporte v Fanchette, above n 6, at [11]. 
11  At [1]. 
12  At [2]. [The statement was made in Creole: "I bon ou piti in bez mor"]. 
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suffering anguish [and] distress" amounting to a fault in law was allowed.13 Simply, actions in 
defamation and other actions in delict stand as distinct substantive regimes. 
2 Remedies 
A similar approach has been taken in the Seychelles courts to the remedies available for 
defamation. In Seychelles Broadcasting Corporation v Barrado, the Court of Appeal held that 
damages are not to be assessed in terms of the Civil Code, but instead should be assessed in terms of 
the remedies available under English law.14 In that case, the trial Judge had erred by awarding 
separate damages for delict under the Civil Code when assessing the damages Ms Barrado, the 
President's personal assistant, should receive for a political broadcast that had accused her of being 
corrupt and of having siphoned off the rental proceeds of state property. This follows the reasoning 
noted by Ayoola JA that the right cannot be separated from the remedy and that it would be "untidy 
and absurd to define the cause of action by English law while determining the remedy by the Civil 
Code".15  
3 Procedural law 
Because defamation is subject to law separate from the rest of the matters in the Civil Code, the 
courts in Seychelles have had to determine how far this separation extends. Specifically, the courts 
have had to determine whether the exception is only applicable to the substantive law and not to the 
procedural law. With the finding in Biscornet v Honoré by Sauzier J that "English law" refers to not 
only the substantive law of defamation but also the procedural rules of defamation,16 the position 
might initially appear to have been settled. 
However, more recently, in Christ v Kurtz, the Court of Appeal took the view that the Civil 
Code only requires defamation claims to be subject to the substantive English law and not to the 
English procedural law.17 The Court considered that there was no express legislative direction 
mandating the application of English procedure and that, in its context, art 1383(3) relates only to "a 
body of substantive rules".18 This position is supported by Gappy v Barallon where the Court of 
Appeal held "the mode and manner of proof … remains the prerogative of the Republic of 
Seychelles and its Courts to regulate and decide upon".19 The particular concern in Gappy v 
  
13  At [11].  
14  Seychelles Broadcasting Corporation v Barrado, above n 9, at [36]–[37]. 
15  At [72]. 
16  Biscornet v Honoré (1982) SLR 451 (SC) at 454. 
17  Christ v Kurtz (2014) SLR 531 (CA). 
18  At [12]. 
19  Gappy v Barallon (2006–2007) SCAR 231 at [8]. 
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Barallon related to the proof of defamation in Creole, one of the official languages of Seychelles.20 
At a football match, the defendant called the plaintiff "voler pick-up" in front of a number of people. 
The statement would have been understood by those present as alleging the plaintiff had stolen the 
defendant's son's pick-up truck. The Court noted that under English procedural law, the Creole 
words would be treated as being spoken in a foreign language but held that in defamation cases in 
Seychelles, Creole and French were not to be treated as foreign languages and alleged defamatory 
statements in those languages would not be required to be proved by a sworn interpreter.21 The 
procedure for claims of defamation is therefore currently that of Seychelles law. 
4 Time 
The courts of Seychelles have also had to resolve the question of whether the "English law" 
referred to in art 1382(3) means "the English law of defamation as it stood on 1st January 1976" or 
the "English law of defamation with all its developmental changes as it stands today".22 Here, the 
Supreme Court, in Prea v Seychelles People Progressive Front, described these two positions as 
that of a "strict constructionist" and "intention seeker" respectively.23 In Prea, the Supreme Court 
favoured an approach which imported the growing English law of defamation, using that body of 
law to determine the liability of the Seychelles People Progressive Front for publishing a newspaper 
article that accused the plaintiff, a member of the National Assembly, of stealing 30 ducks that were 
to be sold in a church fundraising fair. However, this view of the Supreme Court in Prea is not 
consonant with that taken in other cases. On numerous occasions, the Seychelles courts have 
determined that the provision instead exists in a "time warp frozen at circa 1 January 1976 when the 
amended Civil Code came into effect",24 and that the courts "are unfortunately forced to look at old 
authorities and tattered and old editions … of Gatley on Libel and Slander"25 in applying 
defamation law in Seychelles. 
The "time warp" that exists around defamation law in Seychelles has been considered by the 
courts to have considerable implications in light of modern technological developments. In Christ v 
  
20  Constitution of Seychelles, art 4. 
21  Gappy v Barallon, above n 19, at [16]. 
22  Prea v Seychelles People Progressive Front (2007) SLR 108 (SC) at 123.  Professor Chloros in his 
commentary on the Seychelles Civil Code (AG Chloros Codification in a Mixed Jurisdiction: The Civil and 
Commercial Law of Seychelles (North Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1977)) noted at 135, n 
246, that "the relevant wording adopted in the Code is to adopt the English law of defamation as it stands, at 
any given time". 
23  At 123. 
24  Christ v Kurtz, above n 17, at [9]. See also Biscornet v Honore, above n 16. Contrast Kim Koon v Wirtz 
(1976) SLR 101 in which it was held that the law of defamation applicable in Seychelles by virtue of art 
1382(3) is the law in force in the United Kingdom on 31 October 1975. 
25  Christ v Kurtz, above n 17, at [9]. 
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Kurtz, the Court of Appeal observed that the English defamation law as at 1 January 1976 
potentially does not have the capacity to deal with modern advances. The Court specifically 
commented that "the law of defamation needs to be urgently addressed as the issue of publication is 
live given the technological changes brought by the internet".26 This was also a matter discussed in 
Prea, where the Supreme Court noted that the English law on this topic was developed in "an age 
before the advent of internet, television, mobile phones, constitutionalism and free speech" meaning 
the law would be challenged by the "multi-media knowledge-based global society and the changing 
needs of time and jurisprudence".27  
B  Constitution and Defamation 
Article 22(1) of the Constitution of Seychelles protects freedom of expression stating: 
Every person has a right to freedom of expression and for the purpose of this article this right includes 
the freedom to hold opinions and to seek, receive and impart ideas and information without inference. 
This right is subject to "such restrictions as may be prescribed by a law and necessary in a 
democratic society" pursuant to particular interests provided for in art 22(2)(a)–(f). 
1 Civil defamation 
The existence of this protection in the Constitution has had an impact on how civil defamation 
has been approached in Seychelles. In Lalanne v Regar Publications Pty Ltd, the Court considered 
that the applicability of English decisions might be limited by the existence of the protection of 
freedom of expression.28 
2 Criminal defamation 
The presence of the Constitution perhaps has been more noticeably felt in relation to criminal 
defamation. The Penal Code of Seychelles provides for a criminal offence called "libel". Section 
184 of the Penal Code reads: 
Any person who by print, writing, painting, effigy, or by any means otherwise than solely by gestures, 
spoken words or other sounds, unlawfully publishes any defamatory matter concerning another person, 
with intent to defame that other person, is guilty of a misdemeanour termed "libel". 
Appeals on this provision have often focused on its constitutionality. The Court of Appeal in 
Sullivan v Attorney-General noted that:29 
  
26  At [10]. 
27  Prea v Seychelles People Progressive Front, above n 22, at 122. 
28  Lalanne v Regar Publications Pty Ltd (2006) SLR 101 (SC) at 116. 
29  Sullivan v Attorney-General (2014) SLR 417 at [16]. 
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Since the enactment of the 1993 Constitution, there is no doubt that offences such as criminal libel, 
seditious libel, scandalising the court and other allied offences need to be scrupulously examined in the 
light of the constitutional provision for the right to freedom of speech. Be that as it may, these offences 
have survived in this country presumably under permissible exceptions under the Constitution. It is the 
constitutional permissibility of these exceptions that is now in issue. 
The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the Constitutional Court that the offence under s 184 
of the Penal Code was a "restriction as may be prescribed by a law and necessary in a democratic 
society" and therefore allowable by virtue of art 22(2)(b) of the Constitution "for protecting the 
reputation, rights and freedoms or private lives of persons".30 Ultimately the Court did not 
determine whether the prosecution of the defendant for displaying a photograph on his car's back 
windscreen of the Minister of Environment with "a Hitler moustache"31 accompanied by the word 
"Traitor" was constitutionally sound as the matter had not yet been tried.32 
C  A New Act 
The complexities faced by civil defamation claimants have triggered calls for reform in some 
judgments. Particularly, in the case of Prea, the Supreme Court noted that:33 
Before answering this fundamental question [of whether to apply the English law of defamation as it 
stood when the Seychelles Civil Code came into force], one should firstly find out what was the 
intention of the makers of the Civil Code in incorporating the provision under article 1383(3) for the 
importation of English law of defamation? To my mind, their intention should have been to make it a 
temporary or transitional measure in order to govern our law of defamation, until we enact our own 
legislation to replace it. Undoubtedly, they must have intended to do so, in the hope that one day in 
future we would replace the foreign law with our indigenous one and make it a permanent source or 
feature in the body of our civil law jurisprudence.  
…  
Consistency of decisions, speed of resolution and advancement of law with the rest of the world should 
be the cornerstone of any civil system of justice. Our civil law of defamation is not an exception to it. 
Our law of defamation, as presently constituted, fails on those counts leading to uncertainty in the area  
of defamation law and practice and inconsistency of judicial thoughts, approaches and decisions in 
ascertaining the liability and in the assessment of quantum of damages. 
  
30  At [3]. 
31  At [2]. 
32  At [34]. 
33  Prea v Seychelles People Progressive Front, above n 22, at 120–121. 
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The path forward that appears to be envisaged in cases such as Prea is the enactment of a 
Defamation Act incorporating local values and accounting for local conditions; a path that New 
Zealand took when the Defamation Act 1992 and its predecessor were enacted. Whether this 
direction is appropriate for Seychelles and whether Seychelles might learn anything from the New 
Zealand experience are both topics that warrant further consideration. 
III FAMILY MATTERS 
A Introduction 
The particular context for the family law discussion is the social environment of Seychelles,34 
where most stable domestic relationships are those of persons who are not married to each other. 
The consequence is that the majority of children are born outside of wedlock. Taking equality of 
property rights in domestic partnerships and the equality of rights of all children as the goal, the 
question is how the law might be satisfactorily reformed to provide for such equality. 
The first area for consideration is domestic relationships and the property rights of those living 
in stable relationships (en ménage) other than marriage. 
The second concern is the status of children; that is to say, the legal position of ex-nuptial 
children vis-à-vis their parents, inter vivos and in succession. The Code Napoléon of 1804 dealt with 
the rights of legitimate children, legitimated children, adulterine children and incestuous children. 
Seychelles currently retains the distinction between nuptial and ex-nuptial children,35 and has 
specific provisions for the rights of adulterine children in succession. 
Consideration will also be given in this Part to the rights of de facto partners and children in 
succession. 
B Domestic Relationships and Property Rights  
The Matrimonial Causes Act 1992 provides specifically a discretion for the Supreme Court to 
alter spousal property rights at the time of dissolution of a marriage.36 There is no such provision in 
  
34  For contextual material, see Marion Benedict and Burton Benedict Men, Women and Money in Seychelles 
(University of California Press, Berkeley, 1982); Doris Atayi and Eugene Madejski A study on the Situation 
of Families and its Support Systems in Seychelles (Ministry of Social Development and Culture, Mahé, 
2012); The Family Tribunal: 15 Years of Existence (Department of Social Affairs, Mahé, 2013); and Gender 
and Law Manual (Ministry of Social Affairs, Community Development and Sports, Mahé, 2012).       
35  For example Civil Code, arts 312–342. 
36  Matrimonial Causes Act 1992, s 20(1): 
[In the context of divorce, nullity or separation proceedings] the court may, after making such 
inquiries as the court thinks fit and having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including 
the ability and financial means of the parties to the marriage –  
… 
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the case of the termination of a de facto relationship. Where the property of those in a de facto 
relationship is held in the name of only one of the parties,37 the best that the non-title holder can 
hope for is an award under the unjust enrichment provisions of the Civil Code. There has been some 
indication in the courts of a desire to move the system to one not unlike the position with 
constructive trusts at the Common Law, but this is not conceptually possible under the Civil Code 
system and to date has been rejected by the highest court.38 
The French law that was extended to Seychelles in 1808 provided for a number of property 
regimes, but they affected only married couples. The relevant provisions of the Seychelles Civil 
Code were repealed in 1948 by the Status of Married Women Ordinance and, to the extent the 
situation is now covered by legislation, the law is in the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1992. There is 
nothing to preclude a private contractual arrangement in the nature of a marriage settlement, but no 
regimes are provided for in the legislation. The default position is therefore separation of property. It 
is against that background that s 20 of the Matrimonial Causes Act becomes relevant. It is a 
provision for redressing property imbalance statutorily. It is clearly a useful provision but it is far 
from providing the presumed equality of property rights that is found in a number of other legal 
systems.39 Further, it requires litigation to establish a right to share in the property held in someone 
else's name; the person with the vested legal right is in the dominant position at the time of the 
dissolution of the marriage.  
There is another provision, in the Status of Married Women Act 1948, that enables the court to 
make a declaration as to property ownership during the course of a marriage.40 No specific 
provision is made for the determination of the property rights in a subsisting de facto relationship. 
 
 
  
(g)  make such order, as the court thinks fit, in respect of any property of a party to a marriage 
or any interest or right of a party in any property for the benefit of the other party … 
37  As a matter of practice immovable property is more likely than not to be in the name of the male partner 
alone. 
38  AH Angelo and Ashleigh Allan "Common Law Equity in a Civil Law Country" (2013) 44 VUWLR 427. 
39  For example the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (NZ), s 11. 
40  Status of Married Women Act 1948, s 21:  
(1) In any question between husband and wife as to the title or possession of property, either 
party … may apply by petition in a summary way to a Judge. 
(2) The Judge may make such order, direct or make such inquiry, and award such costs as he 
shall think fit. 
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In the current discussions concerning the reform of the Civil Code,41 consideration has been 
given to extending both s 20 of the Matrimonial Causes Act and s 21 of the Status of Married 
Women Act to those living in stable de facto relationships. It is likely that the reference in any 
reform will be to equity in property rights rather than to an extension of the rights of married 
couples to unmarried couples. In other words, the reform would address property rights rather than 
marriage rights. 
In considering the better provision for determining the property rights of those in de facto 
relationships, the focus is on domestic relationships which are characterised by their stability and 
continuity. Suggested factors which would support a finding of stability and continuity are that the 
relationship has continued for at least three years, that a child has been born of the relationship, and 
whether the parties have acquired property in their joint names. It is thought that the holding of 
property in joint names is likely to be the most reliable indicator because it is reported to be a 
common practice and is particularly evident in respect of the acquisition of homes that are 
purchased with mortgage finance. It may well be that the legislator will indicate a number of factors 
which may raise presumptions, but which in the end will simply be indicators for the court when it 
exercises its discretion to determine whether the domestic relationship is one of stability and 
continuity. 
C Status of Children 
The Code in many articles distinguishes between children born of a marriage and those born 
outside of marriage. For instance, arts 331 to 342 all fall within a Chapter entitled "Illegitimate 
Children"; the "Irregular Succession" rules in arts 756 to 760 deal specifically with the rights of 
"natural children".  
Hence against the background of a constitutional right to equal protection of the law and 
Seychelles international obligations, consideration is being given to a new art 370 in the Civil 
Code.42 The new article would state in clear terms that all children have equal status at law and "the 
associated rule" that in matters relating to a child, the welfare and best interests of the child are 
always the paramount consideration. 
  
41  A revision of the Civil Code of Seychelles was commenced on 6 May 2013. The Committee has met 
regularly in open forum since May 2013. In April 2015, having completed a review of all provisions of the 
Code, the Committee went into closed discussion on the report of the Committee, which is to be presented 
in December 2015. 
42  Currently the article is vacant. The Children Act 1982, s 2A(1), provides "Whenever a court or tribunal 
determines any question with respect to the upbringing of a child, the child's wellbeing shall be its primary 
consideration". 
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D Succession 
1 The law 
These matters all flow over into the field of succession. Not only is there a question of the rights 
of the children of the deceased, which at present are unequal, but there is also the question of the 
surviving partner who, if not a surviving spouse, has no right in the partner's succession.43  
The current law provides that in the case of an intestacy, property will descend to children and 
other lineal descendants, and then to ascendants and collaterals.44 In competition with them is the 
surviving spouse who, in the presence of descendants or ascendants, will take the personal chattels 
and half of the estate.45 In the absence of descendants or ascendants the surviving spouse will take 
all the property.46 This provision for intestate succession is echoed in, and to a degree reinforced by, 
the provisions relating to testation. The rights of testation are restricted when the deceased is 
survived by children. In the presence of children there will be a reserved portion which cannot be 
disposed of by will.47 There is no protection in the context of testacy for a surviving spouse. If the 
surviving spouse does not by will receive property that is not covered by the portion reserved for 
children, he or she will receive nothing.  
The principle is that all children are to be treated alike. Article 745 of the Civil Code provides 
that:  
Children or their descendants succeed to their father and mother, grandfathers and grandmothers or other 
ascendants without distinction of sex or primogeniture, even if they are born of different marriages. 
They take in equal shares, and per head, if they are all of the first degree and inherit in their own right; 
they take per stirpes when all or some of them inherit by representation.  
That provision is modified by the rules on "irregular succession".48 Article 757 provides: 
The natural child shall have, in general, and in respect of his father and mother and other ascendants as 
well as his brothers and sisters and other collaterals, the same rights as the legitimate child.  
However art 760 states:  
  
43  Unless there is a will which makes a gift to that partner. 
44  Civil Code, art 731.  
45  Civil Code, art 767. 
46  Civil Code, art 766. 
47  Civil Code, arts 913 to 917. 
48  That is, children born out of wedlock, the surviving spouse and the State. See Civil Code, arts 756 to 769. 
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Natural children, whose father or mother, at the time of their conception, was married to another person, 
shall be entitled to succeed together with any legitimate children of that marriage; in that case, however, 
the share of each such natural child shall be one half of what it would have been if all the children of the 
deceased had been legitimate.  
A strong body of opinion in Seychelles is against any change to this rule relating to the status of 
adulterine children. The reason given is that the adulterine child represents a breach of the marriage 
contract, and in honouring that contract protection should be given to the children born of the 
marriage. Only limited protection should be given to those born of the adulterous relationship.  
2 Reform possibilities 
One way to protect the rights both of de facto partners and of ex-nuptial children in succession 
matters would be simply to amend the relevant articles to eliminate all reference to discrimination 
between children on the grounds of birth status, and to extend the rights of surviving spouses to the 
surviving partners of de facto relationships.  
A more radical, and ultimately much simpler, distribution system was that raised in 2013 in a 
Constitutional Court case that considered the constitutionality of the reserved share provisions on 
succession.49 The challenge in that case was in relation to freedom of disposition of property. 
Article 26(1) of the Constitution provides that every person has a right to property and the right 
to acquire, own, peacefully enjoy and "dispose of property". In art 26(2) "the exercise of the right 
under clause (1) may be subject to such limitations as may be prescribed by law and necessary in a 
democratic society – (a) in the public interest". Article 913 of the Civil Code restricts the right to 
deal with property by way of will. It says: 
[A] gift inter vivos or by will shall not exceed one half of the property of the donor, if he leaves at death 
one child; one third, if he leaves two children; one fourth, if he leaves three or more children; there shall 
be no distinction between legitimate or natural children except as provided by article 915-1.  
By will, the deceased had left property to beneficiaries other than his children; the descendants 
claimed the property reserved to them by art 913. The issue was therefore joined between the 
defenders of the testamentary disposition and the heirs who had reserved rights under art 913. The 
defenders of the disposition in the will referred, among other things, to the manner in which English 
legislation provided protection for close family members within the context of testamentary 
freedom.50 The question was whether art 913 was a limitation on the property rights protected under 
art 26 of the Constitution, and in particular whether it was a limitation "prescribed by law" and 
  
49  Durup v Brassel (2013) SLR 259 (CC). 
50  The legislation was the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) Act 1975. That legislation 
historically drew on the experience of the New Zealand family protection legislation – which in turn had 
drawn on civilian law principles found in the Scottish succession law.  
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whether any such limitation was necessary "in a democratic society … in the public interest". 
Further context was provided by art 32(1) of the Constitution which states that "the State recognises 
that the family is the natural and fundamental element of society and the right of everyone to form a 
family and undertakes to promote the legal, economic and social protection of the family".  
Having established a prima facie case of restriction on the right to property, the burden shifted to 
the State and the descendants to prove that the limitations on testamentary freedom were 
constitutional. The Court had no difficulty in determining that the restrictions in art 913 were 
restrictions on the right to dispose freely of property, and further that they were "prescribed by law". 
The more difficult question was whether the limitations were "necessary in a democratic society and 
in the public interest". The case of Silver v The United Kingdom51 was cited in support of the 
contention that the restrictions were constitutionally valid. An earlier decision of the Seychelles 
Court of Appeal had held that "necessary in a democratic society" implied the existence of a 
"pressing social need".52 Taking into account art 205 of the Civil Code (relating to mutual support 
between spouses) and the intestacy provisions of art 745 of the Civil Code, the Court addressed the 
question of "pressing social need" for the restriction in art 913. In conclusion the Court held that the 
limitation:53 
… in art 913 of the Civil Code affords the widest possible legal, economic and social protection to the 
family, which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is therefore in the public interest 
under art 26(2)(a) of the Constitution.  
It was also held:54  
… that there is also a "pressing social need" to protect the reserved heirs from total and unjust 
disinheritance from a succession, in which they are entitled, to the benefit of third parties. 
A consequence of the decision has been that consideration is now being given to moving from a 
situation of limited testamentary freedom to one of total testamentary freedom, subject only to some 
legislative protection for those near to the deceased. There seems to be general agreement in 
Seychelles that there should be a right to adequate maintenance for a surviving partner and the 
children and parents of the deceased, where any of them was wholly or partly dependant on the 
deceased. 
A shift in principle from one of limited testamentary freedom to one of full testamentary 
freedom would raise the question of whether there is any continuing need for the rules on the giving 
  
51  Silver v The United Kingdom (1983) 5 EHRR 347 (ECHR). 
52  Seychelles National Party v Michel (2010) SLR 216 (CA) at 234. 
53  Durup v Brassel, above n 49, at [43]. 
54  At [46]. 
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of gifts. The Seychelles Civil Code retains the elaborate French Civil Code provisions on gifts. A 
prime purpose of that system is to protect the inheritance rights of members of the immediate family 
of the deceased. The powers of testation in the presence of children or surviving spouse are limited, 
and the control of gift giving inter vivos is one way to ensure that property is available to satisfy the 
reserved shares of successors at the time of the family member's death. If a regime of testamentary 
freedom were introduced, much of the law on gifts and their "calling back"55 to satisfy the interest 
of reserved heirs could be repealed. Intestacy succession laws would remain unaffected, subject only 
to the strengthening of the rights of surviving partners and ex-nuptial children.  
Much of the debate and drive towards equality of rights within the family is reminiscent of the 
developments in New Zealand in 1970 with the Status of Children Act 1969, and in 1977 with the 
commencement of the Matrimonial Property Act 1976.56 The difference in Seychelles is the French 
Civil Code background which provides the common law (droit commun) for Seychelles. 
IV  ADR IN SEYCHELLES 
A Introduction 
In 2010, the Court of Appeal opined that "un mauvais arrangement est mieux qu'un bon 
jugement".57  
"Alternative" or "appropriate" methods of dispute resolution (ADR), in the sense of organised 
alternatives to civil litigation, are both familiar and alien to Seychellois legal culture. In a 
jurisdiction with approximately 55 attorneys, 20 judicial officers and one new law school, the 
formal aspects of ADR – accreditation bodies, professional regulation, private institutions – remain 
essentially absent. Ordinary civil disputes are tried in open court, in the hands of attorneys-at-law 
and judges who are appointed on the Commonwealth model. Court fees are payable at levels that do 
not materially discourage the institution or protraction of litigation; attorneys could until 2012 
benefit from an appearance-based legal aid scheme.58 There is no mechanism for increased costs 
orders, and little sanction for abuses of process. Cases may be "mentioned" 10 times – or more – 
without substantive progress, and many litigants become accustomed to minimal information from 
counsel.  
  
55  Civil Code of Seychelles, arts 920–930.  
56  In 2002, formal provision was made for de facto relationships and also to establish the relationship of the 
domestic property relationship regime to the succession regime: Property (Relationships) Amendment Act 
2001 (NZ). 
57  Vital v Chetty (2010) SLR 442 (CA) at 444. (A bad settlement is better than a good judgment.) 
58  See the Legal Aid (Amendment) Rules 2012.  
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B  Official Endorsement  
In 2010, the Court of Appeal endorsed ADR in emphatic terms. Having "prompted" the parties 
to settle an appeal by consent, the Court in Vital v Chetty took the opportunity to describe the virtues 
of a "consensus theory which complements the conflict theory" and to urge readers to "reserve our 
courts for matters which genuinely could not be resolved between the parties with the assistance of 
counsel".59 In the Court's view, "[e]nhanced professional practice demands that, through their 
specialized knowledge of the law and life, counsel should attempt to minimize litigation rather than 
generate it."60 The ethical obligation arising in this regard is partly reflected in the first local 
professional code of conduct, promulgated in 2013:61 
Duty to inform client about alternatives to litigation 
16.      (1)  At the commencement of, and during, litigation a legal practitioner shall inform his or her 
client of – 
(a)  available alternatives to pursuing litigation; 
(b)  any law, procedure or practice which has the prospect of a substantive advantage if the 
client – 
(i)  pleads guilty; or 
(ii)  takes any steps to reduce the issues, time, costs or distress involved in a 
proceeding. 
The model of ADR presented in Vital v Chetty is lawyer-driven, with emphasis placed 
throughout the judgment on the skill and professionalism of counsel; there is no reference to the 
prospect of proceeding through ADR without a lawyer's "able guidance".62 The Court of Appeal 
also cites its own successful interventions in previous appeals – a process observable at all levels of 
the court hierarchy. 
Both core procedural codes of Seychelles envisage negotiated settlements with a limited degree 
of judicial oversight. The Code of Civil Procedure (cited and applied in Vital v Chetty) requires the 
court to give judgment in accordance with a consent signed by both parties to any civil suit, "unless 
it see cause not to do so".63 The Criminal Procedure Code empowers the court to "promote 
reconciliation" and authorises the "settlement in an amicable way [on terms approved by the court] 
  
59  Vital v Chetty, above n 57, at 443–444. 
60  At 443. 
61  Legal Practitioners (Professional Conduct) Rules 2013, r 16(1). 
62  Vital v Chetty, above n 57, at 443. 
63  Seychelles Code of Civil Procedure, s 131. 
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of proceedings for common assault, or any other offence of a personal or private nature not 
amounting to felony, and not aggravated in degree...".64 The Court in Vital v Chetty, while noting 
the absence of a requirement to attempt mediation before filing, observed that "that does not stop 
parties from adopting this principle based on common sense".65 
B ADR in Practice 
1 Court statistics 
Despite these encouraging words, one senior practitioner estimates that only about 10 to 15 per 
cent of current civil disputes settle without trial (including all forms of ADR), and that of those, only 
a small number are reflected in consent judgments. This is in the context of a pending case load in 
the Supreme Court – the trial court of unlimited general jurisdiction – that has stabilised recently at 
about 1,000 civil cases, with approximately 750 completed in any one year. (The Magistrates' Court, 
the equivalent of the New Zealand District Court, has a workload of about 200 civil cases and a 
much healthier completion rate.) The Supreme Court has, since 2010, adopted aspirational time 
standards for case resolution, set at a maximum of 24 months for ordinary civil suits and 12 months 
for matters on the new Commercial List. However, as at December 2013, a clear majority of 
pending civil suits were older than two years. More than a quarter had been in the system for more 
than five years.66  
2 Arbitration 
Private arbitration is an accepted, though rare, method of resolving commercial and land 
disputes. It is comprehensively provided for in Title IX of the Commercial Code Act 1977, which 
reflects the text of the uniform law on arbitration proposed by the European Convention on 
Arbitration 1967.67 The courts have accepted the enforceability and severability of contractual 
arbitration clauses, consistent with English common law, within the overarching "public policy" 
framework of the Civil Code.68 Even where parties did not contract for arbitration, the Supreme 
  
64  Criminal Procedure Code, s 168.  
65  Vital v Chetty, above n 57, at 444. 
66  See Judiciary of Seychelles Annual Report 2013 (available at SeyLII <www.seylii.org>).  
67  See Omisa Oil Management v Seychelles Petroleum Co Ltd (2001) SLR 50 (SC) at 55, quoting Chloros, 
above n 22, at 156. 
68  See for example Intour SRL v Emerald Cove (2000) SLR 21 (SC) (citing Beitsma v Dingjan (No 1) (1974) 
SLR 292) and Le Roux v Eden Island (2012) SLR 175 (SC)). See further Divino Sabino "Legal and Policy 
Considerations for Effective Alternative Dispute Resolution in Seychelles" (paper delivered at the 
Bar/Bench Symposium on the Role of ADR in Access to Justice in Seychelles, Baie Lazare, Seychelles, 29 
August 2012) (published in the Law Journal of the Bar Association of Seychelles, available at Bar 
Association of Seychelles <www.bas.sc>.  
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Court is empowered by the Code of Civil Procedure69 to refer cases to arbitrators on its own motion 
or by request – not always with happy results. Choppy v NSJ Construction involved a dispute arising 
from a building contract with no arbitration clause.70 The case was referred by consent to a private 
arbitrator (a lawyer). The resulting arbitral award was confirmed by the Court, over the objection of 
one party, but ultimately set aside by the Court of Appeal for "obvious error", with the result that the 
entire case went back for trial before a different Judge.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that an average of six to 10 arbitrations are currently conducted in 
Seychelles per year, by private arrangement or on court direction, which are presided over by senior 
practitioners, retired judges or non-legal experts like valuers. There is no local specialist arbitral 
training and it is not a profession as such. Several senior practitioners who conduct arbitrations are 
also engaged by local clients to act in international arbitrations, some of which have been on a 
significant scale. The potential for growth in both domestic and international arbitration is clear, but 
it remains an essentially private field. 
The most unusual feature of the Commercial Code framework is the adoption as "binding" of 
the provisions of the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards 1958,71 to which Seychelles is not, unlike New Zealand, a party.72 The resulting 
position has proved uncomfortable: in Omisa Oil Management v Seychelles Petroleum Co Ltd,73 a 
standard-form application for leave to register a Swiss award had to be declined on the basis of lack 
of reciprocity between Convention and non-Convention states, and the procedure appears to have 
languished since then. Seychelles' position in this regard may be developing: in 2013, the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration representative in neighbouring Mauritius (which has constituted itself as an 
  
69  Seychelles Code of Civil Procedure, s 205.  
70  Choppy v NSJ Construction (2012) SCCA 14, reversing Choppy v NSJ Construction (2011) SLR 215 (SC). 
71  Commercial Code of Seychelles Act, arts 146–150. Article 146 provides that "[o]n the basis of reciprocity, 
the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958, and the 
arbitral award within the meaning of the said Convention shall be binding ...". Article 148 provides that 
"[a]rbitral awards under the said Convention shall be recognised as binding and shall be enforced in 
accordance with the rules of procedure in force in Seychelles". 
72  This position should not be taken to signal general resistance to arbitration as a dispute resolution 
mechanism, given that Seychelles is a member of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (which facilitates arbitral resolution of investor-State disputes), and has legislated specifically for 
the recognition of United Kingdom arbitral awards (see the Reciprocal Enforcement of British Judgments 
Act 1922), and of foreign court judgments from other jurisdictions, which may themselves reflect foreign 
arbitral awards (see the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1961), in addition to providing 
the Commercial Code framework for domestic arbitration. 
73  Omisa Oil Management v Seychelles Petroleum Co Ltd, above n 67. 
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international arbitration hub) was invited to deliver the New York Convention Road Show in 
Seychelles, co-presented by a Judge of the French Cour de Cassation.74  
3 Institutional mediation 
Institutional mediation, unlike institutional arbitration, is well-established in certain contexts; it 
is compulsory for most complaints brought before the specialist Family Tribunal and Employment 
Tribunal, both of which sat outside the judiciary until 2015. When an employment grievance is 
filed, the (non-legal) officer who receives the file must "endeavour to bring a settlement of the 
grievance by mediation" before the matter proceeds to the Employment Tribunal.75 Mediated 
agreements in that context can be endorsed by the Tribunal as "a form of judgment by consent".76 
Mirroring the top-down focus of the Court of Appeal in Vital v Chetty, the Act focuses on the 
official rather than the parties, providing directions in the event "the competent officer is 
unsuccessful in the mediation".77 Time limits are very strict in theory, with only 28 days allowed in 
ordinary employment disputes and only 7 days where a worker is non-Seychellois. Mediation is also 
a mandatory first resort in most family disputes.78 The Secretary of that Tribunal (currently a law 
graduate) is directed to "request the parties to attend before [her] and endeavour to settle the dispute 
by mutual agreement without any influence being exerted by any outsider", with any mediated 
agreement referred to the Tribunal for approval.79 There are no published statistics for Family 
Tribunal mediations, but those for the Employment Tribunal indicate that more than 25 per cent of 
670 disputes referred to mediation in 2013 were successfully settled, albeit only three resulted in 
judgments by consent.80 
The Fair Trading Commission, established in 2009, has exclusive jurisdiction in consumer 
protection and fair competition matters. The Commission is not obliged to use ADR, but has 
adopted mediation in practice as an alternative to formal investigation of consumer complaints.81 It 
  
74  Fedelma Smith (PCA Mauritius) and Antony Derjacques (President BAS) (PCA/ICCA New York 
Convention Road Show on International Arbitration, Ile du Port, Seychelles, 10 August 2013). Presentation 
materials available at Judiciary of Seychelles "PCA/ICCA New York Convention Road Show on 
International Arbitration, Palais de Justice, 10 August 2013" (10 August 2013) SeyLII <www.seylii.org>.  
75  Employment Act 1995, s 61(1A).  
76  Section 61(1B).  
77  Section 61(1D). 
78  Mediation is compulsory for all disputes within the jurisdiction of the Family Tribunal under the Children 
Act 1982 (including custody, maintenance and issues of consent to treatment), except applications under the 
Family Violence (Protection of Victims) Act 2000. 
79  Children Act 1982, s 78(9).  
80  National Bureau of Statistics Crime Justice & Security Statistics (CJS 2014/Q3, 2014) at table 8.  
81  The Public Service Appeal Board, constituted by ch XI of the Constitution, is another body that in practice 
has used negotiated alternatives to formal proceedings. 
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has published detailed online guidance on its approach to conducting "telephonic", "written" and 
"on-site" mediations,82 and is also regularly publishing encouraging statistics on the number of 
successfully mediated disputes.83 Again, the Commission's self-imposed timeframe for mediation is 
very strict (10 working days), although the statistics suggest this limit is aspirational.  
C Reform Initiatives: Court-Annexed Mediation 
During the tenure of Chief Justice Egonda-Ntende (2009–2014), concerted efforts were made to 
raise the profile of ADR and to encourage and facilitate arbitrated, mediated or negotiated resolution 
of disputes that would otherwise be adding to the unsustainable backlog in the civil courts.84 In 
2011, a workshop on civil case management, supported by the Commonwealth Institute, produced a 
general consensus between Bench and Bar that ADR – particularly mediation – be encouraged, if 
not mandated, in disputes that would otherwise come before the courts.85 A year later, a formal 
symposium on ADR and access to justice was held over two days.86 Again stakeholders expressed 
almost unanimous support for the development of a pilot project in court-annexed mediation, 
particularly in commercial cases. The Chief Justice began working with local drafters and the World 
Bank to develop an appropriate statutory framework. In 2013, the Supreme Court (Mediation) Rules 
were enacted, providing a formal structure for court-annexed mediation in civil cases, and in early 
2014, a senior judge and mediator from the United States spent almost a month in Seychelles 
training judicial officers, practitioners and public servants in mediation, and attempting to build 
public awareness. 
The Supreme Court (Mediation) Rules, as amended in 2014 to include rules of professional 
conduct for mediators,87 now enable almost any pending civil dispute in the Supreme Court to be 
referred to mediation, either at the request of a party or on the Judge's initiative. The mediator can 
be any other judge, or any person authorised by the Chief Justice. The process is designed to be 
typically flexible and informal, on a confidential and without prejudice basis, providing maximum 
opportunity for negotiation between parties, with support and guidance available from the mediator 
  
82  Fair Trading Commission Seychelles "Consumer Guidelines" <www.ftc.sc>.  
83  Fair Trading Commission Seychelles "Mediation" <www.ftc.sc>, indicating that 35 per cent of disputes sent 
to mediation in the first quarter of 2014 were successfully resolved. 
84  See FMS Egonda-Ntende "The Contribution of Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in Enhancing 
Access to Justice and the Administration of Justice in Seychelles" (keynote address to the Bar/Bench 
Symposium on the Role of ADR in Access to Justice in Seychelles, Baie Lazare, Seychelles, 28 August 
2012) (published in the Law Journal of the Bar Association of Seychelles, available at Bar Association of 
Seychelles <www.bas.sc>.  
85  See Sabino, above n 68. 
86  Judiciary of Seychelles "Symposium on the Role of ADR in Access to Justice in Seychelles on the 28th and 
29th August, 2012 at the Kempinski Hotel" (5 September 2012) SeyLII <www.seylii.org>. 
87  Supreme Court (Mediation) (Amendment) Rules 2014.  
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and any attorneys involved. There is no additional cost to parties, at least during the pilot phase. If 
the mediation succeeds, the resulting agreement is entered as a consent judgment; if not, the matter 
is sent back for trial. The timeline is more generous than in the specialist tribunals but still tight (a 
default of 90 days), in an attempt to ensure that reference to mediation does not present an 
opportunity for delay. As for the tribunals, this timeframe has unfortunately proved aspirational so 
far. Uptake has been slow but steady, at around 30 cases per year.  
Submission to mediation is also contemplated in the Rules which established the Commercial 
List in the Civil Division of the Supreme Court in April 2012.88 Once pleadings have closed in a 
commercial dispute, the Court must call a preliminary hearing to determine the issues in dispute 
"and ascertain whether the matter may be submitted to mediation".89 That process should feed into 
the court-annexed mediation structure established by the 2013 Rules. Historical resistance to the 
concept of substantive case management has, however, so far prevented this pre-trial filtering 
mechanism from having much impact. 
Nearly all current Supreme Court Judges and several Magistrates have some formal mediation 
training, and several were mediating their own cases in court for years before the introduction of the 
Rules. However, only a handful of attorneys hold mediator qualifications, and few claim ADR 
within their areas of expertise. Most government officials engaged in supporting or conducting 
institutional mediation are not lawyers and few, if any, hold ADR qualifications. There is no 
specialised regulatory body and, prior to the well-attended courses organised by the Judiciary in 
2014, no local training opportunities. The new LLB degree, taught by the University of Seychelles 
as a remote programme of the University of London, does not yet offer ADR courses. The even 
newer Bar course, delivered by the University on behalf of the Chief Justice, has focused in 
previous years on substantive domestic law (particularly the Civil Code, Constitution and 
procedure). A vocational component, including ethics, advocacy and ADR, is being trialled for the 
first time in 2015–2016. It will be interesting to see whether the new court-annexed mediation 
regime contributes significantly to demand for training of this kind. 
D Future Potential 
The most commonly cited barriers to backlog reduction in the civil courts of Seychelles are 
outdated procedural rules and inefficient case management practices. Pervasive systemic issues of 
this kind can be significantly mitigated by an increased focus on party-led solutions, consistent with 
the basic structure of the Seychelles court system. This does however require small-scale, enabling 
structural reforms of the kind now being progressively introduced, coupled with a change in culture 
that supports informed litigants to take opportunities to engage in ADR, if necessary with the 
guidance of disinterested counsel. Other jurisdictions like New Zealand can lead by example, but 
  
88  Supreme Court (Commercial List) Rules 2012.  
89  Supreme Court (Commercial List) Rules, r 5(1). 
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that change in culture requires local champions and visible successes. Seychelles is still taking its 
first steps in that direction. 
V  CONCLUSION 
The three areas commented upon in this article are all areas to which Bill Atkin has contributed 
both internationally and most specifically in New Zealand. It is to be hoped that some of that New 
Zealand experience will be able positively to inform the developments of a distant jurisdiction 
which is currently seeking to address inadequacies in its law in these same areas.  
Happy 40th, Bill. 
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